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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
As the current global financial crisis recedes and governments contemplate their 
disengagement from the financial systems, it is useful to study whether the lessons from the 
earlier Asian financial crisis, especially those with regard to risk management, played a role 
in confronting the current crisis, and to examine how the Asian countries have faired since 
their crisis in 1997.  The global financial crisis of 2007-09, which began as a credit crisis in 
the United States and spread to Europe and beyond, is considered the most serious global 
economic crisis since the 1930s and has invoked unprecedented responses by various 
governments and institutions around the world.1  The outbreak of the current crisis is widely 
attributed to excessive leveraging and risk mismanagement by U.S. financial institutions in a 
low interest-rate environment, and lax credit regulation that prevailed during the past 
decades.2  Interconnections of financial institutions and financial globalization are blamed for 
the rapid spread of the crisis worldwide.3  
 
When the financial crisis started to have a real bite on the real economy, the Federal 
Reserve’s initial policy response of liquidity provision was subsequently supplemented by 
fiscal stimulus measures.4  Despite these measures, however, the adverse real and financial 
impacts of the crisis on the United States and other developed countries have been extensive.5  
In contrast, the impacts of the crisis on emerging markets (EM) have been less severe.6  
Nonetheless, the ensuing global recession influences emerging markets due to a global 
contraction in the demand for commodities and a global curtailment in the sources of credit 
and financial flows.7 
 
                                                 
1 See generally Ingo Fender & Jacob Gyntelberg, Overview:  Global Financial Crisis Spurs Unprecedented 
Policy Actions, BIS Q. REV., Dec. 2008, at 13-24 (discussing financial policies implemented by various 
countries in response to the global market developments in 2008).  
2 See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: RESPONDING TO THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS AND MEASURING SYSTEMIC RISKS, WORLD ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SURVEYS, APRIL 2009 
[hereinafter GFSR]. 
3 Id at 74. 
4 See Timothy F. Geithner et al., Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Financial Stability Plan (Feb. 10, 2009), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/tg21.htm (announcing measures taken to restore confidence 
in the strength of U.S. financial institutions and to restart credit issuance); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Stamp Lecture at the London School of Economics:  The Crisis and 
the Policy Response (Jan. 13, 2009) (transcript available at 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/publicEvents/pdf/20090113_Bernanke.pdf) (discussing the Federal Reserve’s policy 
responses to the financial crisis). 
5 See Bernanke, supra note 4. 
6 See Jongmoo Jay Choi & Michael G. Papaioannou, Credit, Currency, or Derivatives: Instruments of Global 
Financial Stability or Crisis?, 2009 INT’L FIN. REV. 10, at 10-16. 
7 See Geithner, supra note 4; Bernanke, supra note 4. 
   
 444 
A distinguishing feature of the current crisis is the immediate priority placed on achieving an 
adequate recovery of economies and institutions affected by the crisis, with a lesser 
consideration for fiscal solvency.8  In contrast to the centralized policy implementations 
utilized during the Asian financial crisis, the policy responses in the United States have been 
more decentralized by involving many regulatory institutions and focusing on the rescue of 
large systemic institutions.9  On the other hand, the current U.S. responses are more wide-
reaching than the traditional monetary policy tools adopted in previous crises, and may be 
necessary to provide liquidity to a greater diversity of firms and institutions, and to facilitate 
broader market stability and macroeconomic recovery.10 
 
This article compares the causes and policy responses between the current financial crisis in 
the United States and other developed countries with those of the Asian financial crisis, 
which originated in an emerging market.  Both the U.S. and Asian crises are similar in that 
their financial institutions were the initial depository of shocks due to their mismanagement 
of credits and risks.  As we note in Parts II and III, however, the two crises differ in their 
deeper underpinnings — regulatory deficiencies underpinned the current U.S. financial crisis 
while the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98 could be attributed to macrofinancial 
shortcomings.  We also discuss the major differences in policy objectives — the U.S. 
governmental policies emphasized liquidity and economic stimulus while the policies during 
the Asian financial crisis were geared towards restoring international investor confidence 
through tight monetary and fiscal policies.  Parts IV and V discuss the implications of these 
different policy perspectives and draw lessons for risk management and regulation in order to 
prevent and/or better manage future financial crises. 
 
II.   CAUSES AND RESPONSES TO THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS  
 
The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 jolted the Asian EM countries like no other economic 
event since World War II.  It began with an attack on the Thai Baht in July 1997 that quickly 
consumed the entire country, spreading throughout Asia, and precipitating beyond.11  The 
effect of the crisis was both deep and broad — countries accustomed to decades of 8-10% 
positive annual real economic growth saw their growth plunge to negative 15%.12  As a 
result, hundreds of firms and factories closed their shops and millions of people lost their 
                                                 
8 See Geithner, supra note 4; Bernanke, supra note 4. 
9 The U.S. Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and other financial 
agencies are involved in the effort to strengthen the U.S. financial system.  Four main types of measures were 
undertaken: (i) government guarantees on bank deposits and other bank liabilities, (ii) provisions of liquidity 
support, (iii) capital injections and interventions in financial institutions, and (iv) restructuring and distress asset 
resolution of financial institutions.  See GFSR supra note 2; Geithner, supra note 4; Bernanke, supra note 4. 
10 See Bernanke, supra note 4. 
11 Jongmoo Jay Choi, The Asian Financial Crisis:  Moral Hazard in More Ways Than One, 2000 INT’L FIN. 
REV. 3, at 4. 
12 Id. at 3.  
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jobs.13  Stock prices, as well as currency values, plunged to half their values within days after 
the crisis.14  
 
The crisis was both unpredictable and painful, in part because the Asian government officials 
failed to understand why their economies could not weather the problems, given the past 
trend of continued high growth and economic success.15  The past economic success, 
however, led to their over-confidence and complacency and resulted in sheer blindness to the 
events unfolding across the world.16  Because they failed to account for these global events, 
the Asian governments were unable to innovate and adapt to the globalization and 
development occurring across the world.17 
 
The Asian financial crisis initially started as a currency crisis—slowdowns in economic 
growth reversed capital inflows, and many Asian currencies given their high current account 
deficits and overvaluation came under speculative attack.18  However, the currency crisis had 
deeper reasons: (i) structural problems of domestic financial and corporate systems that 
depended on leverage and large inflows of external borrowings; (ii) mismanagement of 
macro financial risk such as exchange rates and international reserves; and (iii) poor 
corporate governance and inadequate regulations.19  A combination of inadequate domestic 
financial capabilities, inadequate assessment and management of financial risk, and the 
maintenance of relatively fixed exchange rates led banks and corporations to borrow large 
amounts of international capital.20  Most of the borrowed capital was short-term, unhedged, 
and in various foreign-currency denominations.21  Foreign capital inflows continued over 
time to finance sub-par investments.22  These private sector investment and financing 
decisions further fueled the crisis, after the lack of confidence by foreign investors triggered 
a speculative attack and brought about massive currency devaluations.23  In addition, the 
government’s mismanagement and failure to address macrofinancial and governance 
issues—i.e., arbitrary government involvement in the private sector, lack of transparency in 
corporate and fiscal accounting, and governmental mismanagement of the economy—
worsened the crisis.24 
 
With the guidance from the I.M.F., the governments’ immediate responses were to tighten 
their fiscal and monetary policies with the aim of restoring the confidence of international 
                                                 
13 Id. at 3-4. 
14 Id. at 4. 
15 Id. at 5. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 See Graciela L. Kaminsky & Sergio L. Schmukler, What Triggers Market Jitters? A Chronicle of the Asian 
Crisis, 18 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN. 537 (1999); Sheryl WuDunn & Nicholas D. Kristof, Japan, Economic Power 
Aside, Seems Paralyzed by Asia Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1997, at A1.  
19  See Kaminsky & Schmukler, supra note 18. 
20 Id. at 6. 
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investors. In addition, they engaged in (i) corporate restructurings and reforms by inducing 
improvement in corporate capital structure and corporate governance as well as structured 
corporate closings and bankruptcies; (ii) consolidation of the financial service industry by 
interim government takeover and subsequent sales of ailing banks and financial institutions, 
coupled with liberalization of capital markets; and (iii) mitigating social impacts through 
budgetary support via transfer payments and social expenditures over time.25 
 
III.   THE ASIAN ECONOMIES SINCE THE CRISIS:  PERFORMANCE AND REFORMS 
 
For the most part, the government policy measures were successful and the affected Asian 
economies started growing at a fast pace shortly after the crisis was over.  In fact, several 
analysts consider the post-crisis recovery of the Asian economies to be the main cause of the 
emergence and persistence of large current account surpluses across non-China Asia, which 
are a significant counterpart to the cumulative U.S. current account deficits.26  
 
The recovery initially took place in the form of corporate spending reduction, which set the 
stage for subsequent growth.27  Some studies have attributed the post-crisis Asian current 
account surpluses to the reduced corporate expenditure on fixed investment.28  The lower 
corporate spending led to diminished aggregate investment rates, widened the savings-
investment gap, and allowed the region to become a net exporter of capital.29  To some extent, 
this post-crisis reduction in corporate investments reflects an ongoing restructuring 
necessitated by high leverage and excess investments before the crisis.30  Given their still 
conservative corporate investments and aggregate current account surpluses, it would seem 
that even a decade later, the memory of the crisis still partly defines their investment 
decisions in a significant way. At the same time, as the restructuring completes its course, it 
is plausible that investment rates may rise again to contribute to economic growth as well as 
a reduction in the region’s current account surpluses.31 
   
                                                 
25 See Jacqueline Best, The Limits of Financial Risk Management: Or, What We Didn’t Learn from the Asian 
Crisis, 15 NEW POL. ECON. 29 (2010). 
26 See Brahima Coulibaly & Jonathan Millar, THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS, UPHILL FLOW OF CAPITAL, AND 
GLOBAL IMBALANCE: EVIDENCE FROM A MICRO STUDY, (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
International Finance Discussion Paper No. 942, 2008).   
27 Id. at 25. 
28 Id. at 26; Steven B. Kamin, The Revised Bretton Woods System: Does it Explain Developments in Non-China 
Developing Asia? (Feb. 4, 2005) (presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco conference, "The 
Revived Bretton Woods System: A New Paradigm for Asian Development?") available at http://www.frbsf.org/ 
economics/conferences/0502/kamin.pdf. 
29 Id. 
30 Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Lixin Xu, Corporate Performance in the East Asian Financial Crisis, 15 
WORLD BANK RES. OBS. 23 (2009) (founding firm-specific weaknesses in existence before the Asian financial 
crisis). 
31  See Coulibaly and Millar, supra note 26.  
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A.    Key Macroeconomic Parameters for Asian Countries (1995-2007) 
 
To provide a broad perspective on changes that happened since the Asian financial crisis, in 
Table 1 we present selected macroeconomic statistics for four countries primarily affected by 
the Asian financial crisis (Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand).  
 
Several general points emerge.  It is clear that these Asian countries could not keep with their 
pre-crisis high real economic growth of 8-9%.  However, by 2007, ten years after the crisis, 
their growth rates have stabilized to 5-6% — still a quite respectable growth rate by a global 
standard.  At the same time, the Asian economies have become more solid financially.  Their 
current accounts have turned positive, and external debt as a percentage of GDP has 
decreased dramatically.  International reserves as a percent of GDP or as a percentage of 
imports plus external debt have also increased significantly.  This shows that the various 
policies implemented by the Asian governments to address the Asian financial crisis have 
been generally successful. 
 
On a micro level, Cheung and Jang (2008) provides a score card for corporate governance 
rules and regulations including disclosure, as viewed by regional experts, fund managers and 
analysts for nine Asian countries.32  The results indicate a divergence between the regulatory 
environment and market perceptions of corporate governance practices in these countries. 
 
 
Table 1:  Selected Macroeconomic Indicators for Asian Countries (1995-2007)33 
 
 Country 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2005 2007 
Korea                 
         
GDP growth rate (real) 9.2 4.7 -6.9 9.5 8.5 4.0 4.0 5.1 
External debt stock as % of GNI ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
Curr. Acct % of GDP -1.7 -1.6 11.7 5.5 2.3 1.6 1.8 0.6 
Reserves ($ billions) 32.8 20.5 52.1 74.1 96.3 102.9 210.6 262.5 
Reserves % of GDP 6.3 4.0 15.1 16.6 18.0 20.4 24.9 25.0 
Reserves % of (Imports + Ext. debt)  ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
         
Indonesia         
         
GDP growth rate (real) 8.4 4.7 -13.1 0.8 4.9 3.6 5.7 6.3 
External debt stock as % of GNI 63.4 65.1 168.2 117.1 93.6 86.6 48.8 33.9 
Curr. Acct % of GDP -2.9 -2.1 3.9 3.7 4.8 4.3 0.1 2.4 
                                                 
32 The nine countries examined in the paper are China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
33 For the raw data, see International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, 
http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/ (last visited June 21, 2010); the numbers herein represent the authors’ 
calculations. 
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Reserves ($ billions) 14.9 17.5 23.6 27.3 29.4 28.1 34.7 56.9 
Reserves % of GDP 6.7 7.3 22.4 17.7 17.8 17.5 12.1 13.2 
Reserves % of (Imports + Ext. debt) 8.0 8.4 11.5 13.3 13.9 14.5 14.5 21.1 
         
Malaysia         
         
GDP growth rate (real) 9.8 7.3 -7.4 6.1 8.9 0.5 5.3 6.3 
External debt stock as % of GNI 40.6 49.8 62.1 57.0 48.6 52.4 39.5 29.4 
Curr. Acct % of GDP -9.6 -5.8 13.0 15.7 9.0 7.9 14.5 15.5 
Reserves ($ billions) 24.7 21.5 26.2 30.9 28.7 29.8 70.5 102.0 
Reserves % of GDP 27.4 21.1 35.8 38.5 30.5 32.2 51.1 54.8 
Reserves % of (Imports + Ext. debt) 19.3 14.6 22.7 24.6 19.6 21.3 36.3 43.2 
         
Thailand         
         
GDP growth rate (real) 9.2 -1.4 -10.5 4.4 4.8 2.2 4.6 4.9 
External debt stock as % of GNI 60.6 74.6 97.2 81.3 66.0 59.7 30.6 26.5 
Curr. Acct % of GDP -8.1 -2.0 12.7 10.1 7.6 4.4 -4.3 6.4 
Reserves ($ billions) 36.9 26.9 29.5 34.8 32.7 33.0 52.1 87.5 
Reserves % of GDP 22.0 17.8 26.4 28.4 26.6 28.6 29.5 35.6 
Reserves % of (Imports + Ext. debt) 19.6 14.2 18.4 21.8 20.8 23.2 26.7 36.7 
 
B.   Restructuring and Reforms in One Asian Country:  Korea 
 
In order to appreciate the nature and scope of the specific changes occurred in detail, we have 
focused on one country (Korea) and have traced the corporate and financial restructurings 
and regulatory reforms implemented since the Asian financial crisis.  The first major change 
occurred in the area of corporate leverage.  For example, two major Korean companies, 
Samsung Electronics and Pohang Steel (POSCO), have cut down on their debt-asset ratio — 
Samsung went from 74.7% in 1997 to 20.9% in 2007, and POSCO from 58.6% to 19.6%.34  
The average debt-asset ratio for the ten largest corporations (as measured by market 
capitalization) dropped from 73.6% in 1997 to 42.5% in 2007.35  This reduction has been 
matched by an increase in average return on asset from just 1% in 1997 to 7.8% in 2007.36  
 
The corporate and financial sectors have also undergone drastic restructuring in parallel to 
changes in financial leverage.  Of the ten largest business groups (chaebols) in assets as of 
the end of 1997, three (Daewoo, Ssangyong, and Donga) disappeared since.37  In addition, the 
Hyundai group, the largest group in 1997, has split into Hyundai Motors group and two 
smaller Hyundai groups.38  As a result, there has been a drastic change in ranking of business 
                                                 
34 For raw data, see Korea Listed Companies Association KOCO Information, http://www.kocoinfo.com (last 
visited June 21, 2010); figures presented herein reflect the authors’ calculations.  
35 For raw data, see Korea Fair Trade Commission Online Provision of Enterprises Information (OPNI), 
http://groupopni.ftc.go.kr (last visited June 21, 2010); figures presented herein reflect the authors’ calculations.  
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id.  
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groups.  Since chaebols are family-controlled business groups that control several dozens of 
individual firms and dominated the Korean economy, this is a dramatic change during the 
ten-year period. 
 
The banking sector also saw heavy consolidations.  As detailed in Table 2, as of the end of 
1997, each of the ten largest banks (based on assets) have undergone consolidation.39  Eight 
of the ten largest banks either merged or acquired other smaller banks to produce the three 
largest, and presumably more competitive, banks.40  The Korean government also passed the 
Financial Holding Company Act in October 2000, enabling commercial banks, securities 
companies, and other financial firms to be managed under a single corporate roof.41  This was 
done, in part, because combining commercial banking and other financial firms could 
diversify risk and help enhance the sustainability of the financial firms.42  Interestingly, the 
United States has used a similar approach in responding to the current American financial 
crisis, as seen by Bank of America’s takeover of Merrill Lynch, as well as designating 
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley as “commercial banks”.43 
 
The Korean government also intervened in specific financial consolidations.  The cases of 
two large banks—Korea First Bank and Korea Exchange Bank—vividly illustrate this point.  
To save the bank from collapsing at the onset of the crisis, the Korean government through 
its agency nationalized these banks with 100% ownership.44  After the dust settled and the 
financial situation stabilized, the Korean government then engineered sales of the majority of 
shares of these banks to foreign investors.45  Standard Chartered Bank acquired a majority 
stake in Korea First Bank, and Lone Star Fund acquired a majority interest in Korea 
Exchange Bank.46  Notably, in contrast to general hostility against nationalization in the 
United States during the crisis, the interim government takeover of banks went quite 
smoothly in Korea, perhaps because of the severity of the crisis and lack of clear alternatives.  
 
Table 2:  Consolidation of Commercial Banks After the Asian Financial Crisis47 
                                                 
39 See Table 2, infra. 
40  Compiled from data from Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer (DART) by the Korean Financial 
Supervisory Service. (http://englishdart.fss.or.kr). 
41 See Stephanie Strom, U.S. Firm Has Control of Korea First Bank, N.Y. Times B1 (Sep. 17, 1999). 
42 Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, Ten Years After the Korean Crisis: Crisis, Adjustment and 
Long-run Economic Growth, Conference proceeding 08-02, December 30, 2008, available at 
http://www.kiep.go.kr/eng/publications/pub02_view.jsp?page=1&no=183844&sCate=013001&sSubCate=&tab
Value=1. 
43 Robert Weissman, Testimony before the Hearing on "Too Big To Fail – The Role for Bankruptcy and 
Antitrust Law in Financial Regulation Reform," the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Commercial 
and Administrative Law, October 22, 2009. 
44 For raw data, see Korean Financial Supervisory Service Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer (DART), 
http://englishdart.fss.or.kr (last visited June 21, 2010); figures presented herein reflect the authors’ calculations.  
45 See supra note 44.  
46 For a detailed discussion of these events, see Appendix, infra.  
47 For raw data, see Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing Bankscope, https://bankscope2.bvdep.com/version-
2010617/Home.serv?product=scope2006  (last visited June 21, 2010); see also Korean Financial Supervisory 
Services Financial Statistics Information System, http://efisis.fss.or.kr/index.html (last visited June 21, 2010). 
The following changes in the Korean banking sector were observed since the Asian financial crisis: (1) Koomin 
(continued) 
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Dec. 1997    Dec. 2007 








Korea First Bank 1 76.6    Kookmin Bank 1 218.8 
Hanil Bank 2 58.3    Woori Bank 2 187.9 
Kookmin Bank 3 57.0    Shinhan Bank 3 169.0 
Korea Exchange Bank 4 50.2    Nonghyup 4 160.5 
Korea Commercial Bank 5 50.2    Korea Industrial Bank 5 122.6 
Shinhan Bank 6 44.9    Keeup Bank 6 119.3 
Chohung Bank 7 40.9    Hana Bank 7 116.9 
Seoul Bank 8 38.9    Korea Exchange Bank 8 79.8 
Hana Bank 9 17.2    SC First Bank 9 52.9 
Boram Bank 10 14.9    Citi Bank 10 46.9 
 
In fact, the government has implemented a series of reforms across a spectrum of corporate 
and financial sectors and markets, including corporate governance, accounting, banking, 
monetary policy, foreign exchange, capital markets, bankruptcy law and financial 
supervision.48  It is important to note that although these are governmental initiatives rather 
than the ones by the private sector, these reforms are invariably in the direction of market 
liberalization and market competition.  
 
Some of the major regulatory reforms undertaken between October 1997 and August 2001 
include:49 
 
1. Adoption of the floating exchange rate system and the foreign exchange deregulation 
that facilitate freer foreign exchange transactions and international capital flows; 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Bank acquired Daedong Bank (06/98), Korea Long Term Credit Bank (12/98), Dongnam Bank (06/98) and 
Jootaek Bank (11/01); (2) Shinhan Bank acquired DongHwa Bank (06/98), Jeju Bank (01/01) and Chohung 
Bank (04/06). Chohung previously had acquired Chungbook Bank (04/99) and Kangwon Bank (09/99); (3) 
Korea Commercial Bank and Hanil Bank merged and became Hanbit Bank (12/98), which then acquired 
Pyunghwa Bank (12/01). Hanbit changed its name to Woori Bank; (4) Hana Bank acquired Chungcheong Bank 
(06/98), Boram Bank (11/98) and Seoul bank (12/02); (5) Korea First Bank was sold to New Bridge Capital 
(1999), which then sold it (with a profit of more than 5 trillion won) to Standard Chartered Bank in 2005, which 
renamed the bank to SC First Bank; and (6) Korean Exchange Bank had been sold to Lone Star Fund in 2003. 
Recently, Lone Star announced its intention to sell it within one year after legal problems had been cleared with 
the Korean government. See Table 4, infra. 
48 See supra note 46.  
49 See supra note 46. 
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2. Lifting of the limit on foreign equity ownership and related liberalization measures 
that reduce the costs of foreign institutional investors in Korea; 
 
3. Corporate government reforms, such as the requirement that firms of a certain size 
should have outside independent directors on their board; 
 
4. Accounting reforms in terms of the mandated use of external auditors and the 
establishment of the standard accounting governing body and accounting rules; 
 
5. Fair trading law that penalizes inside trading and regulation concerning the internal 
transactions within a business group; 
 
6. Capital market measures that promote corporate discipline and consolidation such as 
mergers and acquisitions by domestic and foreign institutions; 
  
7. Financial holding company law that permits integration of commercial banks and 
other financial firms; 
 
8. Corporate restructuring regulation that requires greater transparency and clarifies the 
role of banks during corporate restructuring;  
 
9. Corporate bankruptcy laws that define procedures concerning liquidation, bankruptcy, 
and reorganization; 
 
10. Interim increase in the amount of bank deposit insurance and measures that give an 
authority for more independent monetary policy to Bank of Korea. 
 
Notably, the general policy directions of many of these regulatory measures came from the 
IMF.50  The Korean government was also eager to reform inadequate Korean corporate and 
financial practices and infrastructure by replacing them with more modern systems and 
infrastructure found in advanced countries.51  Although these reforms took place under 
government initiatives, since these modern systems and infrastructure were more liberalized 
than the existing systems in Korea and other emerging market countries, the end effect of 
these reforms was a shift towards liberalization.  The positive experience of these reforms in 
Korea is consistent with academic studies on the impact of market liberalization in emerging 
markets.52  One Korea-specific study also found that there is a positive impact of outside 
independent director on firm performance.53  Thus, it appears that the substance of the 
                                                 
50 See Asian Dev. Bank, EMERGING ASIAN REGIONALISM: TEN YEARS AFTER THE CRISIS - A STUDY BY THE 
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, OFFICE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, available at http://aric.adb.org/ 
emergingasianregionalism/. 
51 See Korea Institute of International Economic Policy, supra note 42.  
52 See, e.g., Peter Blair Henry, Stock Market Liberalization, Economic Reform and Equity Market Prices, 55 J. 
FIN. 529 (2000) (stating that stock markets liberalization in emerging countries should generate a revaluation of 
equity prices and a fall in the cost of equity capital). 
53 See Jongmoo Jay Choi, Sae Woon Park & Sehyun Yoo, The Value of Outside Directors: Evidence from 
Corporate Governance Reform in Korea, 42 J. FIN. QUANT. ANAL. 941-962 (2000) (providing evidence in 
(continued) 
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financial reforms is important, while the driving source of the reforms (i.e., government or 
private sector) is not — a distinction that seems to have been overlooked in some of the 
recent political debate in the United States. 
 
IV.   THE AMERICAN FINANCIAL CRISIS  
A.   Causes and Implications of the American Financial Crisis 
 
It is widely accepted that the current global financial crisis stemmed from a confluence of 
several factors and events.  The broad underlying causes of the crisis can be grouped into 
three main categories:  (1) macroeconomic or market factors; (2) risk management failures; 
and (3) inadequate regulations or policies.54  
  
Complacency brought about by a long period of expansion in credit and leverage, combined 
with rapid financial innovation, is among the most often-cited macroeconomic or market 
factors for the crisis.55  The crisis was preceded by more than a decade of benign economic 
conditions, manifested by low interest rates, low inflation and growth volatility, and 
abundant liquidity.56  Both creditors and investors shared an increased appetite for risk and 
leverage during this period.57  At the same time, there was a growth of innovative and 
                                                                                                                                                       
support of the positive impact of outside directors and board independence for Korea in the aftermath of the 
Asian financial crisis). 
54 Viral Acharya and Matthew Richardson, Eds., 2009. RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A 
FAILED SYSTEM (2009); Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008, 23 
J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 77 (2009).  See also FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REVIEW – A 
REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS (2009); INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
STABILITY REPORT: FINANCIAL STRESS AND DELEVERAGING - MARCOFINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY 
(2008), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/02/pdf/text.pdf (describing the responses 
taken in Eastern European emerging markets) [hereinafter IMF 2008]. 
55 See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, INITIAL LESSONS OF THE CRISIS FOR THE GLOBAL ARCHITECTURE AND 
THE IMF (2009); Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. System, Productivity and 
Innovation in Financial Services, Address at the Official Celebration of the 10th Anniversary of the Banque 
Centrale du Luxembourg (Nov. 12, 2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kohn20081112a.htm; Mario Draghi, Governor, Bank of Italy, 
Monetary Policy and New Fiscal Instruments, Address at the 2007 Money and Banking Conference of the 
Central Bank of Argentina, Buenos Aires, (June 4, 2007) available at http://www.bis.org/review/r070608b.pdf.  
56  See Ignazio Visco, Deputy Director General, Bank of Italy, Global Imbalances in the Financial Crisis and the 
International Monetary System, Distinguished Lecture at the 18th International “Tor Vergata” Conference (Dec. 
4, 2009), available at http://www.bis.org/review/r091211d.pdf. See also Masaaki Shirakawa, Governor, Bank 
of Japan, International Policy Response to Financial Crises, Remarks at the Symposium Sponsored by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (Aug. 22, 2009) available at 
http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2009/papers/Shirakawa.08.24.09.pdf; INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, MARKET UPDATE, JULY 2009 [hereinafter GFSR 
Update].  
57 See Bank for Int’l Settlements, Private Equity and Leveraged Finance Markets (Committee of the Global 
Financial System (CGFS) Papers No. 30, July 2008); Bank for Int’l Settlements, International Banking and 
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complex structured financial products that made it easier to trade credit risk and thereby 
increased the perceived liquidity of these products.58  For example, bundling mortgages into 
asset-backed securities (ABS), which were then traded rather than held, created an 
impression that the risk of such assets to an institution was minimal, even though it clearly 
remained in the system.59  As a result, there was an unprecedented expansion of mortgages 
and credit in the United States.60  
 
Clearly, multiple risk management failures that left the financial system vulnerable to 
excessive risk-taking contributed to the financial crisis.  It is evident that market discipline— 
which operates as a check against excesses—had failed.  Compensation practices and 
incentives for executives and traders as well as bankers, underwriters, and rating agencies, 
encouraged the weakening of underwriting and credit standards in favor of promoting 
volume growth.61 Inadequate methodologies and incentives for fee revenues may have 
compromised credit rating agencies’ due diligence, while institutional investors’ search for 
yield resulted in excessive reliance on the credit rating agencies.62  Finally, banks may have 
underestimated the liquidity risk in their funding models, due to the misperception of 
counterparty risk of complicated derivative instruments such as credit default swaps, and the 
                                                                                                                                                       
Financial Markets Developments, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW, June 2009; Bank for Int’l Settlements, 
International Banking and Financial Markets Developments, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW, June 2008; T. Adrian & 
H. S. Shin, Liquidity and Leverage, (Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y. Staff  Report No. 328, 2008); GFSR Update, supra 
note 56; GFSR, supra note 2; Financial Services Authority, supra note 54. Examples of increased risk 
undertaken by financial institutions before the crisis include an increase in debt ratios of the five largest US 
investment banks by about four-folds in 1994, as well as a dramatic increase in mortgage backed securities in 
more recent periods. See Choi & Papaioannou, supra note 6. 
58 See Brunnermeier, supra note 54; Charles W. Calomiris, Prudential Bank Regulation: What’s Broke and How 
to Fix It, in Terry Anderson & Richard Sousa (Eds.), REACTING TO THE SPENDING SPREE: POLICY CHANGES WE 
CAN AFFORD 17-34 (2009) [hereinafter Prudential Bank Regulation]. 
59 See Prudential Bank Regulation, supra note 58; Financial Services Authority, supra note 54. 
60 Prudential Bank Regulation. supra note 58; Charles W. Calomiris, The Sub-prime Turmoil: What’s Old, 
What’s New, and What’s Next, 15 J. OF STRUCTURED FIN. 6 (2009). 
61 John F. Laker, The Global Financial Crisis – Lessons for the Australian Financial System: Opening Remarks, 
Australian Economic Forum, Sydney (2009), available at http://www.apra.gov.au/speeches/ 
AEF_190809_JL.cfm. 
62  See Columbia Law School, Credit Rating Agencies Must Be More Accountable to Restore Confidence in 
Financial Markets, http://www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/news_events/2009/august2009/coffee-credit 
(last visited October 9, 2010). See also U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, Administration’s 
Regulatory Reform Agenda Moves Forward Credit Rating Agency Reform Legislation Sent to Capitol Hill 
(July 21, 2009), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg223.htm; SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND 
FINANCIAL MARKETS ASSOCIATION, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL 
MARKETS ASSOCIATION CREDIT RATING AGENCY TASK FORCE (2008), available at 
http://www.sifma.org/capital_markets/docs/SIFMA-CRA-Recommendations.pdf; Kurt N. Schacht, Credit 
Agencies and Investors: Lessons Learned, LOMBARD STREET, http://www.finreg21.com/lombard-street/credit-
ratings-agencies-and-investors-lessons-learned (Oct. 19, 2009). 
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misunderstanding of extreme “black swan” events.63  In some instances, banks established 
off-balance sheet entities to facilitate rapid growth and generate fee income.64  This implied 
poor disclosure of material corporate risk, which further weakened the efficacy of corporate 
risk management. 
 
Policy institutional frameworks have also proven inadequate in preventing the crisis.  
Regulatory and prudential norms necessary for supervisory oversight significantly lagged 
behind financial innovation.65  In addition, financial supervisors lacked a macro-prudential 
perspective, failed to monitor off-balance sheet entities and liquidity buffers, relied too 
heavily on ratings for capital charges, and failed to take countervailing actions.66  In addition, 
central bank liquidity frameworks were not flexible enough to cope with unexpected liquidity 
shocks.  In some cases, crisis management and deposit insurance schemes proved to be 
outdated, and various regulatory agencies were compartmentalized without sufficient regard 
to the interdependencies of financial institutions and markets.67  Further, valuation, 
disclosure, and accounting inadequacies seem to have exacerbated the situation.  For 
example, deficiencies concerning disclosure requirements in accounting methods and gaps 
associated with the valuation and financial reporting of structured products may have been a 
key contributing factor.68   
 
There have been estimates that between the start of the crisis and June 2009, the global 
financial system has suffered worldwide writedowns and credit losses of over $1.5 trillion.69  
These losses are concentrated in the Americas (approximately $1 trillion) and Europe (over 
                                                 
63  See Nassim N. Taleb, THE BLACK SWAN:  THE IMPACT OF HIGHLY IMPROBABLE (2007)  (examining the 
effects of “black swan,” or “highly improbable” events).  
64  See Juliusz Jablecki, The Impact of Basel I Capital Requirements On Bank Behavior and The Efficacy of 
Monetary Policy, INT’L J. OF ECON. SCI. & APPLIED RES. (June 2009) at 16, 19-29 (describing how banks were 
able to establish off-balance sheet entities). 
65 Takatoshi Kato, Deputy Managing Director, Int’l Monetary Fund, Keynote Address at The 43rd SEACEN 
Governors' Conference Jakarta, Indonesia,  The Financial Crisis and Economic Outlook - Lessons for Securing 
the Benefits of Financial Deepening (Mar. 21, 2008), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2008/032108.htm) (describing how financial innovation has been 
carried out in the last few decades).  See also Prudential Bank Regulation, supra note 58; Financial Services 
Authority, supra note 54. 
66  See FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON ENHANCING MARKET 
AND INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE 12-21 (Apr. 7, 2008), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/ 
publications/r_0804.pdf (assessing the deficiencies in the prudential supervision of capital, liquidity, and risk 
management). 
67  Id. 
68 See Acharya and Richardson, supra note 54; Prudential Bank Regulation, supra note 58; Financial Services 
Authority, supra note 54; INT’L MONETARY FUND, THE RECENT FINANCIAL TURMOIL -- INITIAL ASSESSMENT, 
POLICY LESSONS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUND SURVEILLANCE 8-10 (2008), available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/040908.pdf (assessing the importance of lack of valuation, 
disclosure, and accounting as triggers for a financial crisis). 
69 See Int’l Monetary Fund, supra note 68. 
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$450 billion), while Asia has been minimally affected (around $50 billion).70  As a result of 
these stringent conditions, banks in advanced countries increased deleveraging and tightened 
lending standards, while simultaneously lowering cross-border exposure.71These 
developments indicate that Asia has been the least affected by the US crisis, possibly as a 
result of policy reforms implemented in response to the Asian financial crisis as well as the 
Chinese growth and stimulus measures implemented to counter the current global recession.72 
  
B.   Policy Responses to the U.S. Financial Crisis 
 
The initial policy response to the crisis was swift and substantial, reflecting government 
concern on weaknesses in the banking sector that could quickly lead to a widespread crisis. 
Policy interventions focused first on providing liquidity in the financial sector. However, as 
the crisis intensified in the Fall of 2008, governmental responses were aimed at maintaining 
financial sector stability and, in many emerging markets, at avoiding disorderly exchange 
rate depreciations.73  In some countries, vulnerabilities that had accumulated prior to the 
crisis constrained any possible responses.74  This was more pronounced in cases of substantial 
foreign-currency borrowing and unsustainably high rates of credit growth.75 
Public intervention measures to support the financial system involved various institutions, 
including the government, government agencies and the central bank, and employed different 
schemes and operations. Globally, the most common schemes were: (i) deposit insurance 
measures, with governments often injecting funds to deposit insurance agencies; (ii) bank 
debt guarantees, with governments aiming to ensure the smooth functioning of wholesale 
borrowing and credit markets; (iii) central bank measures to ease liquidity, with central banks 
establishing new uncollateralized lending facilities, providing loans using non-traded 
collaterals, and rolling over lending via daily repos, as well as other government liquidity 
support, such as government placements of deposits to banks; (iv) recapitalizations, with 
governments injecting capital in troubled banks and mortgage agencies in exchange for 
preferred or common shares; (v) purchases of assets, with governments buying mortgages 
and other “toxic” assets from banks using different types of financing; (vi) bank loans, with 
central banks and government agencies providing collateralized lending, subordinated loans 
and other forms of capital to banks. Table 3 indicates such response measures for selected 
developed and emerging market countries.  
                                                 
70 Id. 
71 Bank for International Settlements, International Banking and Financial Market Developments, BIS  Q. REV. 
(Mar. 2009). 
72  See Choi & Papaioannou, supra note 6, at 8. 
73  See, e.g., IMF 2008, supra note 54.  
74  See, e.g., id., at 71. See also GFSR, supra note 2. 
75 See GFSR, supra note 2 (describing the vulnerability of financial markets in some emerging markets and its 
implication for systemic risk). See also IMF 2008, supra note 73. 
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Table 3:  Financial System Public Intervention Measures (2008-2009)76 






Asset Management  










































































































In general, when banking systems were under added pressure from deposit outflows and 
possible bank failures, policy responses primarily focused on maintaining stability.  To 
bolster confidence in the banking system, governments raised the deposit-insurance limit and 
expanded the scope of domestic deposit insurance schemes to resolve problem banks.77  As 
the crisis unfolded, some governments also auctioned excess budgetary funds to banks to 
maintain liquidity.78  Gradually, these auctions were scaled back and replaced by an ever-
widening array of central bank facilities including quantitative easing.79  In addition, central 
                                                 
76 See GFSR, supra note 2.  Additional data from authors’ compilation. 
77  See GFSR, supra note 2.  
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
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banks offered guarantees for inter-bank lending to qualifying banks, covering losses in the 
event that the counterparty fails.80  
Given the magnitude of the problems, the US government instituted a variety of monetary 
and financial measures.  The Fed undertook substantial liquidity injections as the economic 
downturn was testing the resilience of the banking systems.81  The Treasury along with the 
Fed also introduced significant regulatory forbearance by easing loan classification and 
provisioning requirements, and also took steps to loosen accounting standards to limit banks’ 
mark-to-market losses and expand access to their unsecured loan auctions.82  In most cases, 
the combination of central bank liquidity provision and regulatory forbearance allowed the 
banking system to overcome the strains from the crisis relatively well, although some banks 
had to be taken into receivership by the FDIC or directly capitalized by the Treasury.83 
As financial sector problems spread to the real economy, fiscal stimulus packages were 
instituted by the Administration and Congress to support domestic demand.  The packages 
included tax cut, as well as additional spending to support such strategic sectors as clean 
energy, health care and education in addition to infrastructure and unemployment 
assistance.84  As the first signs of economic recovery and financial stabilization have been 
observed, indicating that the monetary and fiscal public intervention measures undertaken 
have been effective, the challenge to policymakers now is how and when these injected funds 
can be reversed to reduce the skyrocketing public debt and to fight the looming inflationary 
pressures.85  Already, the United States, along with other countries, has started to gradually 
retire some of the introduced measures that aimed to provide guarantees and enhance 
liquidity in the banking system.86  
V.   COMMONALITIES BETWEEN THE ASIAN AND U.S. CRISES AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
A.   Fundamental Causes of the Asian and U.S. Financial Crises 
 
Many researchers have argued that financial crises share many common causes related to 
fundamental factors.87  In particular, those economic and/or financial factors that indicate 
economic distress and adversely affect investors’ sentiment should be considered as the root 
                                                 
80 Id. 
81 See Bernanke, supra note 4. 
82 Id. See also Financial Services Authority, supra note 65.  
83 Financial Services Authority, supra note 65. See also Geithner, supra note 4.  
84 See Geithner, supra note 4.  
85 See GFSR, supra note 2.  
86 See Choi & Papaioannou, supra note 6, at 10. 
87 See, e.g., Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, The Aftermath of Financial Crises 2 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14656, 2009) (noting that “the antecedents…in banking crises in rich 
countries and emerging markets have a surprising amount in common,” and that in the crises there are similar 
patterns in housing and equity prices, unemployment, and government revenue and debt). 
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causes of financial crises.  Among these factors are a widening current account deficit, a 
deterioration of fiscal deficit, a significant economic slowdown or recession, the bursting of 
stock and/or real estate price bubbles, and increases in the level of short-term foreign debt.88  
 
However, the exact timing of the crisis is difficult to determine on the basis of 
fundamentals.89  Further, most contenders of the fundamental approach agree that extended 
credit is at the core of crises, although its source may vary, with Krugman focusing on the 
monetization of government deficits and McKinnon and Pill pointing out to the role of 
foreign capital inflows channeled through domestic banks, deposit insurance, moral hazard, 
and overlending.90  
 
The U.S. financial crisis of 2007-09—although different from the Asian financial crisis of 
1997-1998 in terms of scale, impact and the role played by financial innovation—has 
exhibited many common causes: prevailing macroeconomic imbalances, large and persistent 
capital flows, excessive leverage, the growth of sub-par investments and asset price bubbles, 
including a property bubble.91  Several observers note that the principal underlying 
shortcoming of most of these factors is a failure of risk assessment, which had also been 
identified as a determining factor for the Asian crisis.92  However, given the inherent 
inadequacy and political difficulty of arriving at institutional and regulatory solutions in 
                                                 
88 See, e.g., Giancarlo Corsetti et al., What Caused the Asian Currency and Financial Crisis? Part I:  A 
Macroeconomic Overview 6-24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6833, 1998) (attributing 
the Asian financial crisis to macroeconomic structural imbalances manifested in current account deficits); 
Graciela L. Kaminsky, Currency and Banking Crises:The Early Warnings of Distress 6-9 (Bd. of Governors of 
the Fed. Reserve Sys., International Finance Discussion Papers No. 629, 1998) (arguing that financial crises 
generally occur in fragile economies in distress from factors such as fiscal deficits, international economic 
slowdown, and foreign capital outflows); Paul Krugman, A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises, 11 J. 
MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING 311, at 311-12, 319 (1979) (arguing that balance-of-payments crises occur when 
speculators anticipate an abandonment of fixed exchange rate, possibly due to an increase in foreign debt, and 
seeks to acquire the government’s foreign reserves). 
89 See, e.g., Graciela L. Kaminsky & Carmen M. Reinhart, The Twin Crises:  The Causes of Banking and 
Balance-of-Payments Problems 15 (Bd. Of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., International Finance 
Discussion Papers No. 544, 1996) (noting that even knowing that there was a balance-of-payments crisis does 
not help predict a future banking crisis). 
90 See, e.g., GFSR supra note 2; Ronald I. McKinnon & Huw Pill, Credible Economy Liberalizations and 
Overborrowing, 87 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 189, 192-193 (1997) (proposing that in an 
internationally liberalized economy, banks, assured by government guarantee of bank deposits, may signal 
higher payoffs for investors than the liberalization reforms warrant, causing a drop in domestic savings and 
overborrowing from the international capital market). 
91 See Best, supra note 25.  
92 See Ilene Graber, Identifying Risks, Preventing Crisis: Lessons from the Asian Crisis, 34 JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMIC ISSUES 377, 377-83 (2000) (arguing that countries have sought to remedy the currency, flight, 
fragility, contagion and sovereignty risks).  See also Paul Volcker, A Perspective on Financial Crises, 43 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON CONFERENCE SERIES 254, 266 (1999) (explaining the concern that “letting 
banks judge their own credits and capital requirements” could lead to problems of transparency and auditing). 
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preventing the crisis, the question is whether crises of this type are inevitable, irrespective of 
how well we can prepare ex ante.93  
 
 While US credit growth, especially mortgage loans, increased dramatically between 2002 
and mid-2007, US real estate prices rose by almost 50 percent during this period.94  These 
signs were also present in East Asia before the 1997 crisis.95 However, what helped fuel the 
US loan expansion was the low interest rate environment and ease of mortgage securitization 
that prevailed in the decade before the US crisis, while in the Asian crisis, it was large capital 
inflows stemming primarily from private sector borrowing.96  Nonetheless, it is clear that lax 
underwriting standards and improper risk management were present in both the US and 
Asian crises.97  
 
As the US financial crisis quickly became a global financial crisis, it became evident that the 
same macroeconomic and microeconomic factors were also to be blamed in the countries 
most affected.  At the macroeconomic level, the main contributing factors were the 
persistence of large global current account imbalances and the sustained period of low real 
interest rates, which generated credit booms in a number of countries and an increasingly 
intense “search for yield.”98  At the microeconomic level, the contributing factors were 
failures in risk management and corporate governance arrangements, distorted incentives, 
inadequate investor due diligence, and weaknesses in regulatory frameworks, in particular 
porous regulatory borders.99   
   
B.   What Triggered the Crises 
 
Under conditions of economic and/or financial distress, what triggers a financial crisis is an 
event – such as the announcement of disappointing unemployment figures or dramatic 
decreases in corporate profits and financial problems of a prominent bank – that completely 
undermine the confidence in the system and makes investors think of the dangers of a 
financial collapse.100  The announcement of the insolvency of the Lehman Brothers in the 
case of the US crisis and that of a persistent decline in company earnings in the case of the 
                                                 
93 See generally Best, supra note 25 (pointing to the uncertainty in risk assessment as an obstacle to objective 
and accurate valuation). 
94 Bandid Nijathaworn, The Current Financial Crisis, Lessons Learned, and Future Implications, Keynote 
Address at the 11th SEACEN Conference of Directors of Supervision of Asia-Pacific Economies, Bangkok, July 
29, 2009, available at http://www.bis.org/review/r090811e.pdf.   
95 Id.  
96 Id.  
97 See Bank of International Settlements, supra note 71. 
98 IMF, 2008, supra note 73.  See also GFSR, supra note 2.  
99 See Best, supra note 25. See also Laker, supra note 61; Nijathaworn, supra note 94; Jablecki, supra note 64. 
100 See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 36–45 
(1978) (describing the examples of how the exogenous shocks affected the economics of the business cycle). 
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Asian crisis unnerved financial markets and became the triggering factors for both of these 
financial crises.101 
 
C.   Policy Responses 
 
In response to the Asian crisis, many important policy reform initiatives were undertaken, 
aiming at strengthening the robust risk management discipline of the domestic financial 
systems.102  The emphasis of these reforms was mainly on instilling prudent regulations, risk-
based supervision and strong risk management.103  In particular, these reforms aimed at 
curtailing excessive leverage and household indebtedness, so as to help maintain domestic 
financial stability.104  In the case of the US and ensuing global crisis, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision agreed in early September 2009 on a comprehensive set of measures to 
strengthen micro-prudential regulation, supervision and management of risks arising from 
systemic, interconnected banks.105  Moreover, it intended to further look to strengthen the 
regulatory capital framework, to enhance loan loss provisioning rules, to establish a global 
liquidity standard, to develop a systemic risk capital charge, and to minimize the conflict 
between accounting standards and prudential supervision, and to address cross-border 
resolutions of financial institutions.106   
 
D.   Implications for Risk Management 
 
It has been widely argued that international creditor banks operating in the Asian markets had 
assumed that their exposure to private borrowers would be protected by an implicit local 
government guarantee.107  This assumption may have induced them to take on larger 
exposures than warranted by normal credit standards.  The Asian financial crisis proved that 
such expectation was unrealistic as the government guarantee turned out no avail, without the 
assistance from the IMF and the international community.  This confirmed the moral hazard 
problem, as the risky loans from international banks were paid up from the IMF-assisted 
funds.108 
                                                 
101 See Graciela L. Kaminsky & Sergio L. Schmukler, What Triggers Market Jitters? A Chronicle of the Asian 
Crisis, 18 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN. 537, 542 (1999) (noting the stock markets in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand 
declined dramatically per day during the crisis, which showed the great volatility). 
102 See Best, supra note 25. Examples of policy reforms include improved value at risk models, fair value 
accounting, and needed, and regulations concerning systemic risk. 
103 Id.  
104 Id.  
105 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Comprehensive Response to the Global Banking Crisis (Press 
Release, Sep. 7, 2009). For policy recommendations after the Asian financial crisis, see BASEL COMM. ON 
BANKING SUPERVISION, Supervisory Lessons to be drawn from the Asian Crisis 3 (Working Papers, No. 2, 
June., 1999). [hereinafter Basel 1999]. 
106 See Basel 1999, supra note 105, at 3. 
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108 See Stephan Haggard, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009).  (discussing the 
moral hazard problems related to the Asian financial crisis).   
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Another important lesson is the recognition of the extent of “the interrelationship between 
different types of risk across markets and countries in times of crisis as well as the speed and 
extent of contagion.”109 
 
From the standpoint of a lending bank, the Asian crisis also proved the importance of country 
risk.  The traditional concept of sovereign and transfer risk must be extended to include 
systemic risks posed by private sector counterparties.  Since the Asian financial crisis, 
several measures were undertaken to improve risk management capabilities of individual 
banks.  In particular, the Basle Committee overhauled the weighting schemes of internal and 
external ratings for determining country risk.110  In addition, it placed a greater emphasis on 
banks’ internal risk assessment practices as well as counterparty risk exposures, while 
supervisory practices moved toward a more risk-based approach for measuring and managing 
risk.111  However, the improvements since the Asian crisis did not prove adequate to avert 
banks’ supervisory and regulatory breakdowns as evidenced in the U.S. crisis. 
 
Meanwhile, the measurement of risk interconnections during crisis periods, and the speed 
with which emerging market can become illiquid, pointed to the importance of using stress 
testing and scenario analysis in addition to traditional risk management methods.112  Further, 
the role of rating agencies should be examined carefully because in both the Asian and U.S. 
crises, there were little changes in their ratings of sovereign and corporate borrowers before 
the crisis, but there were very swift and large rating downgrades after the crisis broke, which 
actually exacerbated the crisis.   
 
E.   Derivatives Regulation 
 
From the U.S. crisis, it is clear that the extent of bank risk is also related to the evolution of 
the financial systems and products overall, which has important implications for risk 
governance and regulation.113  First and foremost, as risk can materialize very rapidly and 
substantially, banking institutions should maintain adequate capital levels at all times.  This 
became evident as only a short time before July 2007, the spreads on bank credit default 
swaps – a key forward indicator of the perceived riskiness of banks – had reached record 
lows.114  
 
The nature and scope of the credit risks that emerged in the global financial system from  
complex, structured sub-prime instruments, and their interconnections with market risks were 
not adequately understood.  Instead, it was widely believed that the development of 
                                                 
109 See Basel 1999, supra note 105. 
110 Id. See also Best, supra note 25.  
111 See Basel 1999, supra note 105. 
112 Id.  
113 See Prudential Bank Regulation, supra note 58, at 17, 21 (stating the effect of the failure of the prudential 
regulation of commercial banks and investment banks). 
114 See Choi & Papaioannou, supra note 6, at 6.   
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securitization markets would distribute credit risks to a diversified group of investors and 
thereby making banks safer and counterparty risk for individual investors minimal.115   
However, when the crisis broke, the majority of securitized credit risks were held by major 
international banks and by unregulated, highly-leveraged near-banks, which lack adequate 
understanding of the risks involved and possible value losses from adverse unexpected 
market developments.116  Given the difficulty in understanding and valuing these derivative 
transactions and their impacts on systemic risk, there may be a call for regulating derivatives-
related trading.  
 
F.   Compensation and Board Governance 
 
In addition to inadequate financial regulation and excessive reliance on uninformative credit 
ratings, the U.S. crisis also suggests that misaligned risk incentives for mortgage 
underwriters and structured-instrument sellers were among the core problems that led to the 
crisis. Since bonus or market-based compensations may lead to excessive risk-taking by 
financial institutions, several lessons could be learned in this regard. First, managerial 
compensation (including traders’) should be aligned with the objective of ensuring long-term 
sustainability of the institution as well as limiting its contribution to systemic risk. 
Specifically, variable remunerations such as bonuses, stock options or commissions should 
be symmetric with changes in either direction depending on long-term performance and 
should also be kept within some pre-determined range.  Clawback provision and vest period 
limitation may also be needed to constrain personal exploitations of asymmetric corporate 
risk-taking as well as profiting from short-run market gyrations.   
 
In principle, the board is responsible for developing the executive compensation policies.  
However, given the fact that many board directors are selected de facto by the CEO, it is 
doubtful that they would have either independence or expertise to go against the CEO and to 
take account of the interests of shareholders or the aggregate economy.  Provisions that 
executive compensations should be voted upon in the shareholders meeting may help.  
However, the recent experience of banking firms boosting bonuses even in the face of 
declining profits or government bailouts suggests that these accountability measures at the 
individual financial institution level should be incorporated into a country’s prudential 
macrofinancial framework for governance.117 
 
Good governance is important in developing sound risk management, as boards take a major 
role in defining and determining the risk profile of financial institutions.  In the U.S. financial 
crisis, it is clear that boards of a number of major financial institutions failed to carry out that 
role.118  As potential antidotes, the board needs to formulate a sound risk management 
strategy, including a decision on the extent of a firm’s involvement in complex financial 
instruments as well as designing appropriate risk management strategies.  In doing that, the 
                                                 
115 See Acharya and Richardson, supra note 54.  See also Laker, supra note 61.  
116 See Acharya and Richardson, supra note 54. 
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board needs to integrate risk management with the overall corporate growth strategy.119  In 
addition, the board should oversee regular stress testing to determine the firm’s liquidity and 
capital needs.  
 
VI.   THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS IN LIGHT OF THE AMERICAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
Even though the current global financial crisis is still evolving, several preliminary lessons 
may be drawn at this juncture.  The first lesson is that financial crises can originate in 
developed economies as in emerging markets.  The current US financial crisis is largely 
facilitated by an expansion of domestic credit and financial innovation.120  In contrast, the 
Asian financial crisis was deepened by shallow domestic financial markets, which had 
pushed the Asian firms and banks to seek external financing.121  Both the U.S. in 2007 and 
emerging Asia in 1997 had significant current account deficits and a declining international 
competitiveness, but these only turned out critical for Asia that maintained fixed exchange 
rates and not so for the U.S. given the seigniorage of the US dollar as an international reserve 
currency and solid credit reputation of U.S. government despite large external debt 
accumulations.  However, in both contexts, the excessive leverage-financed expansions were 
the fundamental reason that led to the financial crisis.122   
 
A second lesson is that the deficient and fragmented regulatory and supervisory systems in 
the U.S. contributed to the excessive leverage that fueled the current U.S. crisis. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission approved the debt-to-equity ratio of major investment 
banks to go up from approximately 10:1 to 40:1 in 1994, and the repeal of the Glass-Steagall 
Act removed the Chinese wall between commercial and investment banks and insurance 
companies in 1999 while the supervisory authorities were still fragmented along the old 
industry lines.123  This contrasts with the Asian financial crisis (and other emerging market 
crises) where the primary reason was the lack of trust by international investors in the 
sustainability of the countries’ macrofinancial policies.124 
 
A third lesson is that the seriousness of a crisis in terms of its adverse impacts may 
necessitate unconventional as well as conventional monetary and fiscal policy measures to 
effectively deal with the crisis.  It is interesting that while the initial symptoms (collapse of 
financial institutions) and fundamental reasons (excessive leverage) are the same, the 
macroeconomic policies undertaken in the U.S. now and Asia then are diametrically opposed 
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to each other.125  The U.S. government is engaging in monetary policy easing and 
expansionary fiscal policies, while the Asian governments during their crisis were forced to 
undertake tight monetary and fiscal policies imposed by the IMF.126  The implication is that 
two opposite policy measures, if well designed and executed, could work to cope with 
financial crises in different institutional and market settings. 
 
As we are going forward, the current crisis revealed various regulatory shortcomings both at 
the national and global level, as well as several inadequacies regarding the financial crisis 
management and resolution framework, that need to be addressed.  Among these issues are  
the  design of international financial support mechanisms for systemically important financial 
institutions and financial systems with an objective of establishing a clear process for 
coordinating management and resolution authorities regarding global financial risk, and the 
adoption of international accounting standards for financial institutions at times of serious 
financial distress  that minimize arbitrary and non-transparent assessments of troubled assets 
and institutions.127  
 
Further, no other crisis than the current U.S. financial crisis has elicited such an extensive 
battery of public intervention measures globally since the Great Depression.  From the outset, 
it became evident that the taming the crisis would require a political will at the country level 
for a swift design and effective implementation of comprehensive response strategies.  
Critical in the development of this strategy is a balance between a swift implementation of 
such strategies and the control of moral hazard problems arising from the shift of risks from 
shareholders and creditors of specific financial institutions to the sovereign governments or 
international institutions.  Whether this balance was upheld in policy measures taken during 
the current U.S. financial issue, as well as during the Asian financial crisis, is an open issue. 
 
In retrospect, the Asian financial crisis highlighted the importance of: (1) a sound 
macroeconomic policy framework, and the dangers of unsustainable large current account 
deficits; (2) fuller disclosure of all relevant and reliable economic and financial data on a 
timely basis; (3) financial sector reform, including better regulation and supervision; and (4) 
promotion of good governance, with enhancement of the accountability and transparency of 
fiscal  accounts as its key feature.128  These lessons from the Asian crisis have certainly 
helped shape the policies undertaken during the current U.S. financial crisis. However, the 
failings that led to the U.S. crisis raise the question of whether the factors that led to the 
Asian crisis were well-understood and properly addressed globally, and whether they pose a 
new challenge for drawing new lessons from the U.S. financial crisis.  
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VII.   CONCLUSION 
 
In comparing and contrasting the Asian and U.S. financial crises, we can summarize the main 
similarities and differences with respect to their causes, responses and implications as 
follows:  
 
(1) Both crises are partially caused by excessive leverage.  However, the Asian crisis has 
more basic real sector reasons, while the U.S. crisis originated in the mortgage and financial 
sector;  
 
(2) Part of the reasons for the Asian financial crisis was the underdevelopment of domestic 
financial market infrastructure, while the U.S. crisis is partly due to the overdeveloped 
financial innovations.  However, in both cases, the failure of risk management aggregated the 
problems;  
 
(3) Government policies after the crisis were almost the opposite of each other – tight 
monetary and fiscal policies in Asia and easy monetary and fiscal policies in the U.S.  
However, both might make sense given the different economic situations, i.e., uncertainty 
about the sovereign risk for the Asian government, but not so for the U.S., and greater and 
global implications of the U.S. crisis;  
 
(4) Both crises have moral hazard problems, albeit in a different context.  However, excess 
compensation and incentive misalignment appears to be the major problem for the U.S., but 
not in Asia;   
 
(5) Asia fared better in the current global financial crisis partly because of the major reforms 
undertaken since the Asian financial crisis; and  
 
(6) Many of the reforms undertaken in Asia in the aftermath of its crisis, as well as policy 
responses, have implications for the current debate for the regulatory reform in the U.S. 
 
In the Asian financial crisis, the redesigning and reforming economic and financial systems 
to effectively address large capital flows and to manage the associated risks proved to be 
major challenges for regulators and policymakers.  In response to the strong capital inflows 
and liquidity, banks had overextended in leverage and lending, which gave rise to asset price 
bubbles and overvalued currencies.  In the current U.S. crisis, the Fed’s low interest rate 
policy as well as capital inflows from abroad also created an abundance of liquidity and led 
banks to be lax in their lending policies, resulting in the real-estate boom and sub-prime 
mortgage crisis.  Going forward, to prevent such bubbles and consequent crises, it is 
imperative that the risk management of financial institutions continue to be strengthened and 
regulators be prepared to use macro-prudential measures proactively to reduce systemic risk.  
This implies that credit standards and bank capital rules remain vigilant regardless of market 
conditions.    
 




Corporate and Financial Reforms in Korea in the aftermath of the Asian Financial 
Crisis 
Announcement 
Date Contents Area 
      




11/25/1997 This law gives the Bank of Korea more independency over monetary 





The government agency provides deposit insurance for the full amount of 




12/10/1997 Stock market was opened to foreign investors more broadly. The total 
foreign ownership of a listed firm increased to 50%, and the limit for an 
individual foreigner investor increased to 7%. 
Capital  
markets 
12/16/1997 The floating exchange rate was adopted. Foreign 
exchange 
1/18/1998 Corporations with assets of more than 7 billion won are mandated to hire 
external auditors registered with the government.  
Auditing 
2/1/1998 Listed corporations must have at least one outside independent director or 




2/1/1998 Regulation limiting internal investments within the business groups was 
suspended during the period of February 1998 to March 2001.  
Fair  
Trading 
2/15/1998 Regulations on mergers and acquisitions by foreign investors are eased. Capital  
markets 
2/24/1998 As per the recommendation of the World Bank, three laws pertaining to 
corporate bankruptcy was enacted: liquidation, bankruptcy, and 
reorganization. This law has been amended once in 1999. 
Corporate 
bankruptcy 
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3/1/1998 Foreign investors are permitted to create funds to purchase bond or stocks 
for arbitrage purposes, with special tax benefits. This is designed to 
provide liquidity to troubled Korean firms.  
Capital 
markets 
5/16/1998 Limits on foreign investor in stock trading were abolished. Capital 
markets 
6/1/1998 Government announced a two-step Foreign Exchange Liberalization plan. 
The first step is to simplify foreign exchange transactions, and the second 
is to remove most regulations on foreign exchange transactions. 
Foreign 
exchange 
1/2/1999 The Financial Supervisory Service was established by consolidating four 
existing supervisory bodies (Banking Supervisory Authority, Securities 
Supervisory Board, Insurance Supervisory Board, and Non-bank 
Supervisory Authority) into a single supervisory body. It is subject to 
oversight by the Financial Services Commission, and shares some 
responsibility with the Securities and Futures Commission. 
Financial 
Supervision 
2/1/1999 Foreign investors can establish vulture funds to buy troubled firms for 
restructuring and subsequent sale for profit. 
Capital 
markets 
4/1/1999 The first step of the Foreign Exchange Liberalization Plan regarding the 




1/1/2000 This amendment mandates that publicly traded large firms (asset more 
than 200 billion won) have at least one outside independent directors or 
that number of outside independent directors be more than half of the 
number of directors in the board. 
Corporate 
governance 
7/27/2000 The Korean Accounting Standard Board was established to create 
accounting standards for Korean firms. 
Accounting 
10/1/2000 Securities of trouble companies can be pooled to facilitate sales.  Corporate 
Restructuring  
10/13/2000 Financial holding companies are allowed to own more than one financial 
institution. By this law, existing financial institutions can become 




1/1/2001 The second step of the Foreign Exchange Liberalization Plan regarding 




8/14/2001 Corporate restructuring law (effective from 8/14/2001 to 12/31/2010) is 
enacted to provide greater transparency of firms, to enable financial 
institutions to better monitor borrowing firms, and to restructure troubled 
firms with market mechanisms. This law defines the role of financial 
Corporate 
Restructuring  
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institutions during the corporate restructuring process and revises 
procedures concerning corporate restructuring. 
    
Unless noted otherwise, the announcement date is also the effective date. 
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